France’s demographic equation has flipped. In 2025, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, the country recorded more deaths than births. Natural population change turned negative at -6,000, a striking reversal from +205,000 only a decade earlier. The population still grew by 0.25%, but exclusively because net migration, estimated at +176,000, more than compensated for the natural deficit. Immigration is no longer a supplementary factor in France’s population growth. It is the only factor.
That structural shift is the backdrop against which every other immigration statistic must be read. As of 1 January 2026, France had 69.1 million inhabitants, of whom 8.0 million were immigrants (11.6%) and 6.3 million were foreign nationals (9.1%). These are not interchangeable figures, and the gap between them reveals one of the most misunderstood dimensions of French immigration: one in three immigrants (2.6 million) has already acquired French nationality and is no longer counted as a foreigner.
How many immigrants live in France in 2026?
The latest official estimate
INSEE’s provisional estimate for 2025, the most recent available, counts 7.97 million immigrants in France, or 11.6% of the total population of 68.85 million. The figure covers France excluding Mayotte and is based on advanced population estimates; it is not a final census count. A separate INSEE publication referencing 1 January 2026 puts the immigrant population at 7.9 million, also at 11.6%, reflecting the same underlying estimate.
Immigrants versus foreign nationals versus foreign-born residents
The French statistical architecture rests on a distinction that is legal and biographical, not ethnic.
| Category | Definition | 2025 estimate | Share of population |
|---|---|---|---|
| Immigrant | Born abroad as a foreign national, residing in France; status persists after naturalisation | 7.97 million | 11.6% |
| Foreign national | Holds foreign nationality, whether born in France or abroad | 6.30 million | 9.1% |
| Foreign-born resident | Born outside France, regardless of nationality at birth | 9.63 million | 14.0% |
The immigrant category includes 2.6 million naturalised French citizens; the foreign-national category includes roughly 1.0 million people born in France to foreign parents. A person born in France to immigrant parents is therefore not an immigrant under French statistics, a distinction that public debate routinely collapses.
The long-term trajectory
The immigrant share fell to 5.0% in 1946, rose to 7.4% by 1975, stabilised through the 1980s and 1990s, and has climbed steadily since 1999, when it stood at 7.3%. The acceleration is recent: the share passed 10% in 2019 and 11% in 2024. The 2024-2025 figures are not directly comparable with earlier years because INSEE improved its census collection protocol, creating a methodological break in the series.
Immigrant population and share, selected years
| Year | Immigrants (thousands) | Share of population (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 1946 | 1,986 | 5.0 |
| 1975 | 3,887 | 7.4 |
| 1999 | 4,374 | 7.3 |
| 2010 | 5,514 | 8.5 |
| 2020 | 6,847 | 10.2 |
| 2025 (p) | 7,970 | 11.6 |
Source: INSEE. Pre-2024 and post-2024 figures are not directly comparable due to a census protocol change.
Where do immigrants in France come from?
Africa is now the largest continental source of France’s immigrant population, accounting for 49.2% in 2025, up from roughly 45% a decade earlier. Europe accounts for 30.3%, Asia for 14.3%, and the Americas and Oceania for 6.2%.
At country level, the Maghreb dominates: Algeria (12.6%), Morocco (11.7%), and Tunisia (4.9%) together represent more than 29% of all immigrants. Portugal (7.2%) remains the largest European source, followed by Italy (3.5%), Turkey (3.5%), and Spain (3.0%). Sub-Saharan African origins are more diversified: Côte d’Ivoire (2.2%), Comoros (2.1%), Senegal (2.0%), Cameroon (1.6%), and Mali (1.4%) are the largest individual contributors.
Immigrant population by region of birth, 2025
| Region of birth | Immigrants (thousands) | Share (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Africa | 3,923 | 49.2 |
| Maghreb | 2,333 | 29.3 |
| Other Africa | 1,590 | 20.0 |
| Europe | 2,414 | 30.3 |
| Asia | 1,141 | 14.3 |
| Americas, Oceania | 494 | 6.2 |
| Total | 7,970 | 100 |
Source: INSEE, annual data 2025 (provisional).
How origins are changing
The stock of immigrants is still disproportionately European relative to recent flows. Among immigrants who entered France in 2024, 45.9% were born in Africa and 26.6% in Europe, while Asia accounted for 18.1%, a higher Asian share than in the resident stock. The countries of origin of new arrivals are also more diversified than the resident population: Algeria (7.9%), Morocco (7.4%), and Tunisia (4.8%) remain the largest, but their combined share of the flow is well below their share of the stock.
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Why do people move to France?
Employment and labour migration
Economic migration is not the dominant legal pathway into France. Of the 384,000 first residence permits issued in 2025, up 11% year-on-year, family reasons accounted for the largest bloc, while humanitarian permits surged 56.8% to 88,001, making them the second-largest category of first issuance. Subsidiary-protection permits alone more than doubled (+116%). Economic permits were a minority and, in some categories, declined.
This matters for interpreting the labour-market impact of immigration: a large share of new arrivals enter through family or humanitarian channels, not through employer sponsorship. Among immigrants who arrived in 2024 and were aged 15 or over, 33% were in employment at the start of 2024, 41% of men and 26% of women. Employment rates on arrival varied sharply by origin: 49% for Europeans, 28% for Asians, and 25% for Africans, partly reflecting age composition and the higher share of students among African and Asian arrivals.
Education and international students
France hosted 443,500 international students in 2024-25, a record and a 17% increase over five years. In 2025, the country issued 118,000 first residence permits for study reasons, up 6.4%, alongside 12,700 short-stay student visas. International students are a distinct legal and demographic category: many return home, while others transition to work permits. The government has signalled an intention to “reinforce selectivity” for foreign students, suggesting that the student channel may tighten.
Family reunification and family migration
Family migration is the largest single legal pathway. At the end of 2025, 4.47 million valid residence permits were held in France, a record high and an increase of 3.2%; family-related renewals rose 12%, driving the overall increase. First issuance for family reasons was roughly stable at around 91,100 permits, but the stock effect of family migration is cumulative and substantial. Family migration is also the pathway most resistant to short-term policy restriction, because it is anchored in legal rights and established family ties.
Asylum, refugees, and humanitarian protection
Asylum applications fell 5.5% in 2025 to 145,270 (including appeals), down from a record 153,715 in 2024. The decline has accelerated in 2026, with a 20% drop in the first half of the year. First-time applications at single-desk reception centres numbered 116,476, while the overall first-instance protection rate stood at 41.2%.
The humanitarian route has nonetheless become more visible in residence-permit data: the 56.8% surge in humanitarian first permits in 2025 reflects both protection decisions and the arrival of Ukrainians under temporary protection, with Ukrainian nationals the fastest-growing nationality in the permit statistics (+248%).
First residence permits by main reason, 2025
| Reason | First permits (approx.) | Change 2025/2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Family | ~91,100 | +0.1% |
| Humanitarian (incl. refugees, subsidiary protection) | 88,001 | +56.8% |
| Economic | ~38,000 to 40,000 | Declining in some categories |
| Students | 118,000 | +6.4% |
| Total first permits | 377,462 to 384,000 | +9.2% to +11% |
Sources: Ministry of Interior / DGEF, provisional 2025 data. Totals differ because of slightly different reporting scopes; both are provisional.
How does immigration affect France’s population growth?
Natural change versus net migration
The arithmetic is now unambiguous. In 2025: 645,000 births, 651,000 deaths, natural change of -6,000. Fertility fell to 1.56 children per woman, down from 1.61 in 2024, and the average age at childbirth reached 31.2 years, up from 26.5 in the late 1970s. Deaths are rising structurally as the baby-boom generation ages: 651,000 deaths in 2025, +1.2% year-on-year, and the annual toll is projected to continue increasing for decades.
Net migration of +176,000 more than offset the natural deficit and produced population growth of roughly 0.25%. This is not a French peculiarity: in the EU as a whole, deaths have exceeded births since 2012, and Eurostat projects that by 2050 deaths will exceed births by nearly 2 million per year across the Union.
Components of population change, France, 2025
| Component | 2025 estimate |
|---|---|
| Births | 645,000 |
| Deaths | 651,000 |
| Natural change | -6,000 |
| Net migration | +176,000 |
| Total population change | ≈ +170,000 |
| Population, 1 Jan 2026 | 69.1 million |
Source: INSEE / INED.
Why net migration is not the same as the number of immigrants
Net migration is a residual demographic estimate, not a count of visas or arrivals. It measures the difference between all entries and all exits, including French citizens returning from abroad, foreign nationals leaving, and changes in the status of people already present. INSEE’s 313,000 immigrant entries in 2024, down from 347,000 in 2023, are a flow of foreign-born people intending to reside in France; net migration of +176,000 is smaller because it nets out departures and emigration of both immigrants and native-born French people. The two figures answer different questions: one measures arrivals, the other measures the net demographic contribution.
What are the economic and social consequences?
Employment and labour-market outcomes
The labour-market gap is persistent and large. In 2025, the unemployment rate was 12.4% among immigrants and 11.7% among descendants of immigrants, against 6.5% for people without migratory ancestry. Among immigrants from Europe aged 15 to 64, 65.8% were in employment and 10.4% of the active population was unemployed; non-European immigrants fare considerably worse, with employment around 61.5% against 70.5% for people born in France.
Labour-market indicators by migratory status, 2025
| Group | Employment rate (%) | Unemployment rate (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Immigrants (all origins) | ~62 to 66 | 12.4 |
| European origin | 65.8 | 10.4 |
| Descendants of immigrants | Not available in this table | 11.7 |
| No migratory ancestry | ~70.5 | 6.5 |
Sources: INSEE, 2025 annual data; inegalites.fr synthesis. Employment rates vary by origin and age structure; the European-origin figure is not directly comparable with the all-immigrant aggregate.
Public finances: contested estimates, methodological caution
The fiscal impact of immigration is one of the most politically charged questions in French debate, and the range of estimates reflects fundamentally different methodologies, not merely different data.
A parliamentary question in April 2026 cited figures claiming that immigrants’ tax receipts cover only 86% of the public spending attributed to them, a 14-point deficit described as a European record, and referenced OECD and ministerial cost estimates of €41 to €48 billion per year. The same intervention cited an INSEE estimate that immigrants would contribute an additional €45 billion per year to public accounts if their employment rate matched that of French people without migratory ancestry. This is a counterfactual calculation of unused fiscal potential, not a measure of net fiscal cost.
A separate estimate from the organisation iFRAP puts the “extra cost” of precariousness and poverty among immigrants at over €10 billion per year, including €16.2 billion in benefits and €13 billion in unemployment allowances, on the basis of selected categories of spending.
The methodological problems are substantial. Fiscal impact varies enormously across an immigrant’s lifetime: young labour migrants are typically net contributors in working age, while family and humanitarian arrivals may be net recipients in the short term. Attributing all public spending on education, health, and housing to immigrants without also attributing the broader economic activity they generate produces an accounting partial equilibrium, not a causal estimate. No single number can capture the fiscal effect of a population whose age structure, employment trajectories, and legal pathways are as heterogeneous as France’s immigrant population.
Integration, discrimination, and social mobility
Research consistently documents hiring discrimination against candidates with North African or Arab-Muslim names. Correspondence testing, using paired applications identical in qualifications but differing in name consonance, has been used extensively in France and almost universally finds disadvantage for Maghrebi-origin candidates. A government-commissioned testing exercise across 20 occupations in 2026 extended the method to perceived social origin and place of residence as well as name-based origin.
The second generation is the pivot point: more educated than its parents, more likely to be French by nationality and language, yet more likely to report discrimination than the immigrant generation itself. The gap between integration in human capital and exclusion in access to opportunity is the defining feature of the French second-generation experience.
What do France’s immigration policies actually regulate?
Work, family, study, and residence permits
The legal architecture was significantly tightened by the law of 26 January 2024 “to control immigration and improve integration”, known as the CIAI law. Key provisions include:
- From 1 January 2026, a civic examination is required for a multi-year residence card, a resident card, or naturalisation.
- Language requirements have risen: an A2 level is required for a multi-year card from 2026, with further increases phased in.
- The “talent passport” and related economic migration routes were modified by a decree of 13 June 2025.
- The Retailleau circular of 2 May 2025 instructed prefects to apply stricter criteria to regularisation, particularly for economic and private-and-family-life grounds.
Asylum and irregular immigration
Asylum applications are falling, but the stock of unresolved cases and the protection rate remain politically salient. Regularisations fell sharply under the Retailleau circular: total regularisations dropped from roughly 34,700 in 2024 to 28,610 in 2025, and by 42% in the first nine months of 2025, with work-based regularisations down 54% and private-and-family-life regularisations down 58%. The Ministry of the Interior estimates the undocumented population at around 700,000, a figure that carries wide uncertainty margins and is not a census count.
Naturalisation and citizenship
Naturalisations fell in 2025. The Interior Ministry processed 117,866 applications, up from 105,941 in 2024, but acquisitions fell 6.8% to 62,235, of which 17,579 were by declaration through marriage. Moroccan nationals represented 15% of new French citizens. In 2026, decree-based naturalisations fell further to 13,162, a 69% annual decline, reflecting both the new civic examination and tighter administrative practice.
Naturalisation and regularisation, 2024-2025
| Indicator | 2024 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Naturalisation applications processed | 105,941 | 117,866 | +11% |
| Acquisitions of French nationality | ~66,700 | 62,235 | -6.8% |
| Regularisations (total) | ~34,700 | 28,610 | -17.6% |
| Work-based regularisations | Not available | Not available | -54% (Jan-Sep) |
| Private/family-life regularisations | Not available | Not available | -58% (Jan-Sep) |
Sources: Ministry of Interior / DGEF; Senate and Assembly documents.
What could immigration mean for France’s population by 2050 and beyond?
INSEE’s central population projection to 2070, published in 2026, assumes a net migration balance of +150,000 per year and a fertility rate stabilising at 1.45 children per woman from 2028. Under these assumptions:
- The population continues to grow until 2037, reaching 69.8 million, entirely because of net migration.
- From 2037, net migration no longer offsets the natural decline, and the population begins to fall.
- By 2070, the central scenario projects 65.9 million inhabitants, 3.2 million fewer than in 2026.
- The low-migration scenario projects 60.9 million; the range across scenarios is 61 to 71 million.
The ageing trajectory is more certain than the total: by 2040, there would be 49 people aged 65 or over for every 100 people aged 20 to 64, up from 40 per 100 in 2026; the number of centenarians could quadruple by 2070.
INSEE population projection scenarios, 2070
| Scenario | Key assumptions | Population in 2070 |
|---|---|---|
| Low | Lower fertility and/or net migration | 60.9 million |
| Central | TFR 1.45; net migration +150,000/year | 65.9 million |
| High | Higher fertility and/or net migration | Up to 71 million |
Source: INSEE, 2026 population projections. Migration assumptions are a modelling input, not a forecast; the projection illustrates the mechanical role of migration under stated assumptions.
Conclusion: A demographic transition that is already here
France’s immigration debate is often conducted as if the country were arguing about a future that might or might not arrive. The 2025 data settles that question: the future has already arrived. Natural growth is negative, net migration is the sole engine of population increase, and the immigrant and second-generation populations are embedded in every region, sector, and institution.
What remains genuinely uncertain is not whether immigration will shape France’s demographic future, since it will under every plausible scenario, but whether French institutions will adapt to the population that demographic change has already produced. The data point to a country that depends on immigration for its demographic stability while simultaneously maintaining labour-market barriers, housing segregation, and discriminatory practices that prevent a substantial part of that population from contributing at its full potential. The fiscal counterfactual of €45 billion in additional annual contributions if employment gaps were closed is not a forecast; it is a measure of the cost of exclusion.
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FAQs
1. How many immigrants live in France in 2026?
INSEE’s provisional estimate for 2025 is 7.97 million immigrants, or 11.6% of the population. This includes 2.6 million who have acquired French nationality. The foreign-national population is 6.3 million (9.1%).
2. What percentage of France’s population is foreign born?
14.0%, or 9.6 million people, were born outside France in 2025, a broader category than “immigrant” because it includes French citizens born abroad (1.66 million).
3. Which countries do most immigrants in France come from?
Algeria (12.6%), Morocco (11.7%), Portugal (7.2%), Tunisia (4.9%), Italy (3.5%), and Turkey (3.5%) are the largest source countries. Africa supplies 49.2% of all immigrants, Europe 30.3%, and Asia 14.3%.
4. What is the difference between immigrants and foreign nationals in France?
An immigrant is defined by birthplace and nationality at birth: born abroad as a foreign national, now living in France. The status persists after naturalisation. A foreign national is defined by current nationality. One in three immigrants is a French citizen, so the categories overlap but are not identical.
5. Is immigration the main source of France’s population growth?
It is now the only source. In 2025, natural change was -6,000, with deaths exceeding births, and net migration of +176,000 accounted for all population growth. Population increase is projected to depend entirely on net migration until around 2037.
6. How many asylum seekers come to France?
145,270 asylum applications were recorded in 2025, including appeals, down 5.5% from 2024’s record. The first-instance protection rate was 41.2%. Applications fell a further 20% in the first half of 2026.
7. How does immigration affect France’s ageing population?
Migration slows but does not reverse ageing. The old-age dependency ratio is projected to rise from 40 per 100 in 2026 to 49 per 100 by 2040 and 62 per 100 by 2070 under the central scenario. Migration adds working-age population, but the baby-boom cohorts reaching high-mortality ages drive the increase in deaths regardless of migration levels.
